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‘Where do we start?’ Mesogenic participation as an alternative to the ‘top-down’ and 
‘bottom-up’ approaches to public engagement with science and technology decision-
making 
 
Abstract   
 
Processes of participatory and deliberative democracy can be thought of as 
alternatives (or supplements) to the ‘picket-fence democracy’ of representative 
politics and the ‘picket-line democracy’ of social movement politics.  In many areas 
of social science, discussions concerning the extension of public participation into 
decision-making processes are taking place, with Science and Technology Studies 
(STS) being the exemplar.  These discussions centre on theoretical concerns over the 
nature of public participation; questions such as ‘what form(s) should participation 
take?’ and ‘who should be responsible for its organisation?’ Generally, social 
scientists identify two broad and opposing models of organisation: ‘top-down’ 
(government-led) participation and ‘bottom-up’ (citizen-led) participation.  Critiques 
of these models have led to the identification of significant limitations in both.  STS 
scholars generally assume the role of analyst or evaluator, although examples do exist, 
albeit sporadically, of participation processes which have been organised by the 
independent social scientist.  Such work can be seen to constitute a third, social 
science-led model of participation.  This paper provides a typology of public 
participation models.  The typology consists of the exogenic, endogenic and 
mesogenic models of participation.  The exogenic and endogenic models are 
characterisations of the top-down and bottom-up approaches respectively, to which is 
added a suggested characterisation of the mesogenic model.  It is argued that the 
mesogenic model, as a pragmatic alternative, can offer a compromised solution to the 
limitations of the exogenic and endogenic models, thus allowing for more robust and 
more useful public participation processes.  It is hoped that the typology will serve as 
a useful heuristic device for future research into social science-led participation 
processes.   
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Public participation: Where do we start? 
 
Mankind likes to think in terms of extreme opposites.  It is given to formulating its 
beliefs in terms of Either-Ors, between which it recognises no intermediate 
possibilities (Dewey, 1963: 1). 
 
The popularity of ‘public participation’ seems to be ever-increasing within many fields of 
social science research, with Science and Technology Studies (STS) being the exemplar.1  
Indeed, research on the role of ‘the public’ (or ‘publics’) in decision-making on science and 
technology (S&T) issues, is one of the defining agendas of the Public Understanding of 
Science (PUS), a sub-discipline of STS.  This research is centred on the view that the growth 
of science and technology within society should be accompanied by a concomitant growth in 
public engagement with science and technology and their societal applications.  Within this 
paradigmatic view however, there is ongoing debate concerning the nature of public 
participation.  Pertinent questions being discussed include: ‘what form(s) should participation 
take?’ and ‘who should be responsible for its organisation?’  In formulating typologies of the 
various public participation processes and methods (e.g. Abelson et al, 2003; Fiorino, 1990; 
Wakefield, 2001), social scientists have generally directed their attention to the former 
question over the latter.  Irwin and Hagendijk’s (2006) survey of European citizen 
engagement cultures is a notable exception.  Their critical analysis aims ambitiously at the 
construction of a typology of different ‘modes of governance’ in different European policy 
cultures, of which ‘deliberative governance’ is just one example.  Irwin and Hagendijk’s 
project is however different – indeed significantly more ambitious - than the one undertaken 
in this paper.  Their work resonates with Rowe and Frewer’s (2005) overarching ‘typology of 
public engagement’ – within which public participation is but one particular form of 
engagement (along with public communication and public consultation – see below).   In 
comparison, this paper undertakes a more modest project; one which has perhaps been 
overlooked for this very reason, but one which can nevertheless serve as a useful heuristic 
device for future empirical research in this area.  This paper attempts to construct a typology 
of public participation models. 
The first section of the paper builds on the work of Irwin and Hagendijk (2006) and 
Rowe and Frewer (2005) to offer a general definition of ‘public participation’ and to locate it 
within the broader concepts of ‘governance’ and ‘engagement’.  Wider still, it seeks to locate 
participatory democracy on the overall democratic political spectrum – between the two 
(quite polarised) models of democracy to which it is a supplement.  After public participation 
has been located within its wider political context, the paper then offers a more detailed 
definition, via the characterisation of the different participatory models.  STS researchers 
usually work with (sometimes tacitly) two opposing models of public participation: the ‘top-
down’ (government-led) participation and the ‘bottom-up’ (citizen-led) participation.  Both 
models are also commonly seen to relate to general trends within the Public Understanding of 
Science - namely the ‘deficit’ (or ‘technocratic’) model of PUS and the ‘constructivist’ (or 
‘democratic’) model of PUS.  This paper offers a brief characterisation of the bottom-up and 
top-down approaches via the deficit and constructivist models of PUS.  In using the term 
‘model’, it refers to all those participation processes which have a similar point of origin: that 
is, how and by whom participation is initiated.  The approaches are discussed as the exogenic 
and endogenic models.  After discussing some problems with and limitations of both models, 
                                                 
1 As such STS and specifically S&T‐related decision making will be referred to throughout this paper, although 
many of the typology’s aspects could also be relevant and applicable outside of this field. 
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it introduces a third, pragmatic model for public participation in S&T decision-making - the 
mesogenic model – for which it offers a suggested characterisation.   
 
Placing public participation in democratic politics: Between the picket fence and the 
picket line 
 
A definition of public participation might be best achieved through reference to what it is not 
(cf. Gutmann and Thompson, 2004:  13).  As suggested above, Rowe and Frewer (2005) have 
defined public participation within the broader context of ‘public engagement’.  They 
distinguish those mechanisms associated with participation from those associated with 
communication or consultation according to the direction of information flow.  The defining 
feature of participation is the presence of a dialogue between members of the public and the 
sponsors.  Information flow is therefore two-way, unlike in communication, where 
information is disseminated from the sponsors to members of the public, or in consultation, 
where information is elicited from members of the public by the sponsors (consultation) 
(Rowe and Frewer, 2005).  Using this typology, Rowe and Frewer (2005) categorise methods 
such as the Citizens’ Jury, Consensus Conference and Deliberative Opinion Poll as public 
participation processes.  Irwin and Hagendijk (2006) share a similar aim.  Through their 
analysis of European trends in ‘scientific governance’ they suggest that deliberation (between 
citizens and political agencies) is only one of six ‘mode of governance’ which both coexist 
and conflict with one another.  Parallels between Irwin and Hagendijk’s (2006) and Rowe 
and Frewer’s (2005) typology are evident.  ‘Market governance’ for example uses public 
consultation processes as devices through which the public valuation of, and demand for, 
science can be ascertained.  ‘Educational governance’ on the other hand, resonates with the 
emphasis in public communication processes on ‘bringing science to the public’.  
‘Deliberative governance’ of course, resonates most closely with Rowe and Frewer’s (2005) 
public participation processes and their emphasis on two-way dialogue between sponsors and 
the public.  However, as will be discussed in following sections, within ‘deliberative 
governance’ or ‘public participation’, how democratic this ‘two-way’ information flow is (i.e. 
how ‘two-way’ it actually is) depends on who is organising the process.  Consequently, as 
well as categorising types of public engagement processes, or cultures of governance, it is 
also useful to typologise the various models of public participation, according to their point 
(or source) of origin. 
 In addition to those identified above, Irwin and Hagendijk (2006) also propose 
‘discretionary’, ‘corporatist’ and ‘agonistic’ modes of governance.  In the two former modes, 
public engagement is limited, with policies being seen to emerge largely from negotiations 
within government or between stakeholders.  In the latter, governance is characterised by 
‘conflict and opposition’ between policymakers and the public. It is important to remember 
that forms of democratic practice are not related only to ‘participation’ or even ‘engagement’ 
as these terms have come to be understood and defined.  As such, before progressing onto an 
in-depth discussion of specific models of participation, it might prove useful to locate 
participatory democracy per se, on the broader spectrum of democratic politics.  The 
‘participatory paradigm’ is a democratic philosophy which presents itself as an alternative - 
or rather as a supplement to – other democratic philosophies such as representative politics 
and social movement politics.  It can be located somewhere between what might be referred 
to as ‘picket fence’ democracy and what might be referred to as ‘picket line democracy’.  
Representative democracy is the established, dominant model of Western political systems.  
The constitution of such systems is rooted in the idea that political representatives are to be 
elected and are to make decisions on behalf of the (best interests) of the electorate.  This 
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model has been seen to possess a number of limitations, with participatory and deliberative 
democracy theorists contributing significantly to the critique of representative democracy.  
Elster (1998: 2), for example, suggests that although the electorate do have a share of 
political control – insofar as they can choose whether or not to re-elect – this control is 
indirect and therefore ‘diluted’.  The representative model is also referred to as the 
aggregative model, since it ‘adds together’ the preferences of the electorate (either through 
voting or through public opinion surveys) without requiring any discussion of the reasoning 
behind those preferences (Gutmann and Thompson, 2004).  That preference which is most 
fair and most rational (in an instrumental sense) is simply that which has the most votes 
behind it.  The representative model is therefore pejoratively seen as a ‘majoritarian’ form of 
decision-making akin to the cost-benefit style of decision-making characteristic of ‘the 
market’ (Gutmann and Thompson, 2004: 14).  Citizens, in choosing between competing 
‘products’ (i.e. political candidates and parties), act much like consumers (Gutmann and 
Thompson, 2004).2 Such a model is seen to foster a competitive approach to democracy, 
where individuals behave (through voting choices) strategically in order to protect private 
interests and maximise personal gains (Mansbridge, 1983; Cohen, 1997; Elster, 1997; Young, 
2000).  Only those views which represent the majority are acted upon, with minority views 
being precluded as a result.  Criticisms of this ‘capitalist’ system of decision-making often 
align themselves with classical (left-wing) critiques of liberal democracy, which associate 
practices such as representation with the bourgeois middle-classes.  From this point of view, 
the representative system of political decision-making might be considered a ‘picket fence 
democracy’.  ‘Social movements’ on the other hand, are forms of ‘non-institutional’ 
collective political action which stand in opposition to the traditional interests-based politics 
[of the representative model] and which often ground themselves in left-wing political 
philosophy and manifest themselves in protest actions (della Porta and Diani, 1999).  
Traditionally, those involved in social movements are ‘mobilised’ by an issue which affects 
them (personally and/or ethically), and become engaged in political conflicts which aim to 
directly facilitate (or oppose) social or political changes.  As such, although considerable 
discussion no doubt takes place within social movements, and also between social movement 
actors and institutional actors, it is generally felt that direct political pressure is a more 
successful means of advancing the movement’s aims.  As Della Porta and Diani (2006: 16) 
suggest, for social movements - which place a heavy emphasis on ideology (cf. Della Porta, 
1995) - ‘the central focus of “political process” is the interaction between institutional 
political actors and protest’ (see also, Rucht, 1996).3  In this respect, political activity 
associated with social movements might be considered a form of ‘picket-line democracy’.  
The task here however, is to discuss how a model of participatory and deliberative democracy 
relates to the representative and direct action models of democracy.  How does public 
participation fit in ‘between the picket fence and the picket line’? 
 The underlying premise of the participatory paradigm is that citizens make a direct 
contribution in political decisions, and deliberative democrats add that this contribution 
should be made via the dialogic exchange of reasoned views on a given political problem.  
Emphasis is placed not on reaching a decision which satisfies the majority, through the 
instrumentally-rational aggregation of individual views, but on reaching a decision which can 
                                                 
2 It could be argued that the term ‘citizen’ is used somewhat inappropriately here by Gutmann and Thompson, 
given that, as will be discussed in this paper, it resonates with participatory and deliberative democratic 
theory, and contrasts with the ‘passive voter’ characteristic of the representative model. 
3 It should be noted that in this discussion I am explicitly referring to traditional over ‘new’ social movements.  
Social movements have quite different characteristics, for example their ‘non‐ideological’ nature (Della Porta 
and Diani, 1999). 
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be reasonably accepted by all, through communicatively-rational (cf. Habermas, 1996) 
participation.  As Porter (1995: 3) suggests, too much ‘trust in numbers ... discredits genuine 
democratic political participation.  A deliberative system of democracy allows for the 
inclusion, rather than the ‘demeaning’ (Porter, 1995) of minority views – in turn allowing for 
what de Tocqueville (1835) warned of as the ‘tyranny of the majority’ (also, Mill, 1892) to be 
avoided.  Importantly, the deliberative system allows for the reasoning behind (minority and 
majority) views to be exchanged and given due consideration.  The fairest and most rational 
decision is therefore not necessarily that which - in the absence of deliberation - would 
receive the most votes, but rather that which - following deliberation - comes to be seen as 
having the most acceptable reasons behind it.  Social movements of course are also a means 
through which people can directly involve themselves in politics.  They have in common with 
the participatory paradigm the conviction that members of the public are themselves political 
actors with political consciousnesses whom do not need elected representatives to mediate or 
‘dilute’ their share of political control.  Where these two models diverge is in their 
interpretation of the best means by which people should become directly involved.  Whereas 
social movements traditionally advocate (usually antagonistic) instrumental action (usually in 
the form of resistance and protest), participatory processes advocate (usually consensus-
seeking) communicative action through deliberative engagement between citizens and 
between citizens and political institutions.  The other central difference relates to the 
motivation behind political involvement.  In social movements, as suggested above, people 
become involved (or 'mobilised’) because they are in some way directly affected by the issue 
at stake.  As such they enter into political activity as a partisan with strong, preconceived 
views.  Public participation however, is premised on the idea that, participants do not have 
any strong, preconceived views.  As STS has pointed out, the ideal participant is the non-
partisan, ‘disinterested’ citizen or ‘idiote’ (Kotchetkova and Evans, 2007; Lezuan and 
Soneryd, 2007). 
 Like most schemas, the one presented here simplifies the definition of public 
participation vis-a-vis representative democracy and social movement activism.  As some 
social scientists have suggested (e.g. Leach, Scoones and Wynne, 2005), some types of social 
movement, particularly new social movements, could also be considered forms of civic 
engagement, because of their disassociation with (left-wing) political ideology and because of 
their new emphasis on reaching consensus – rather than maintaining conflict – with political 
institutions (cf. della Porta and Diani, 2006).  As alluded to earlier, another consideration is 
‘how democratic’ actually are public participation processes, in terms of how well they 
represent and include all strata of the designated population.  Of course, this opens up both 
methodological and philosophical ‘cans of worms’ which cannot be sufficiently discussed 
within the remit of this paper.  Some brief considerations are, for example: ‘Who should take 
part in a participation process?  How is ‘the public’ to be defined? What does it mean to be 
representative? How are the public to be sampled?  Such substantial issues have had, and will 
continue to have, much scholastic ink dedicated to them.  In short, it is important to consider, 
not just how forms of participation include people, but more importantly how they exclude 
people.  Those attempting to organise a participation process must consider whether and why 
certain members of ‘the public’ (however defined) are more likely to take part than others.  
Without such a consideration, and without exploring means and methods for including a 
diverse range of views, it is possible that public participation is just as ‘picket fence’ as the 
representative model.  After discussing the wider political context within which ‘public 
participation’ can be located, it is now possible to return to the central project of this paper: 
the construction of a typology of public participation models. 
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The typology: An overview  
 
The twin aims of this paper are the critical (re-)characterisation of established models of 
public participation and the suggested characterisation of a ‘new’ third model.  In many 
respects, the success of the paper’s second task depends on the success of its first task.  That 
is, before a third model of public participation in S&T decision-making can be discussed as a 
viable alternative to the two established models, it is first necessary to establish why there is a 
need for a third model at all.  This will be achieved in the following sections of this paper.  
First however, an overview of the typology, including its nomenclature, will hopefully be of 
use to the reader. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The three types of public participation and their organisational direction 
 
 
As illustrated in figure 1, the three types of public participation in S&T decision-making can 
be termed exogenic, endogenic and mesogenic.  Whilst the terms exogenic and endogenic are 
neologisms (or proposed neologisms at least) within this area of STS research, the models of 
participation to which they refer are neither new in terms of their theoretical underpinnings 
nor in terms of their practical applications.  The exogenic model refers to all those 
participation processes which are organised externally (‘from outside’) by a sponsoring 
agency or institution – who are usually stakeholders in that issue.  This model has hitherto 
been referred to as the ‘top-down’ approach.  Chronologically, the exogenic model of 
participation can be considered the first model of participation, and arguably, the exogenic 
model is necessarily conceptually antecedent to the endogenic model.  This chronology is 
explored diagrammatically and (perhaps too?) simply in figure 2.  The chronology of the 
typology will also be referred to throughout the following sections of this paper.  The 
endogenic model consists of those participation processes which are organised internally 
(‘from inside’) by the participating citizens themselves, as opposed to an outside sponsoring 
agency or institution.  The endogenic model positions itself in opposition to the exogenic 
model and defines itself in terms of its perceived limitations of the exogenic model.  This 
Sponsors 
Social 
Endogenic 
Mesogenic 
Exogenic Public(s) 
Participating Sample 
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model is therefore commonly referred to as the ‘bottom-up’ approach to participation.  This 
might be considered the second model of public participation in S&T decision-making.  It 
sees itself as critical of, and therefore superior to, the exogenic model.  The exogenic model 
has been explored to the greatest degree practically, whilst the endogenic model has received 
the most theoretical attention, largely via its critique of the former.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: the chronological development of the exogenic and endogenic models of 
participation 
 
In this paper, the labels ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ are generally avoided.  This is not 
because the author necessarily sees them as inaccurate, or in terms different to those scholars 
who have used them hitherto to conceptually describe the different approaches to 
participation.  The new nomenclature is introduced for two main reasons.  Firstly, it does so 
in order to distance itself from the somewhat Marxist connotations of the terms top-down and 
bottom-up.  As discussed above, the political philosophy espoused by deliberative democrats 
is far nearer the centre that those political philosophies ‘from below’.  Participation, 
according to theories of deliberative democracy is better captured by terms synonymous with 
inclusion/exclusion (e.g. ‘from within/from without’) rather than those synonymous with 
oppression/subversion (e.g. ‘from above/from below’).  Secondly, and the main reason as to 
why these new terms are deemed more appropriate, is because they allow greater room for 
the introduction of a third model.  As the quote from the pragmatist philosopher John Dewey 
at the beginning of this article suggests, inquiry all-too-often proceeds based on blind faith in 
the existence of, and need for, straightforward dichotomies.  In turn, this often precludes the 
consideration of intermediate forms.  Given that, as we will see, the ‘ideal types’ constituting 
a binary are often by their very nature prone to limitation (where limitations are identified 
according to the relative strengths of their opposition), intermediate forms can be a more 
pragmatic (i.e. useful) alternative.  In this instance, an intermediate form of public 
participation in S&T decision-making is seen to be desirable.  This alternative form – the 
1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
BSE 
Inquiry 
Exogenic 
participation  
(‘Neo-deficit’ PUS)  
Political 
practice 
STS 
theory  Constructivist   Endogenic participation 
2010
Royal 
Society 
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     Public Communication / Deficit 
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mesogenic model - conceives of participation as being organised ‘from the middle out’.    It is 
these considerations which have led to the renaming of the top-down and bottom-up 
approaches as the exogenic and endogenic models.  All three models will now be explicated 
and critically discussed in more depth.   
 
 
Exogenic participation 
 
Those forms of public engagement with S&T which have been referred to as top-down can be 
discussed according to two broad trends: the ‘deficit model’ of the public understanding of 
science and what might be termed the ‘neo-deficit model’ of public participation (see figure 
2).  The original deficit’ model of PUS (Wynne, 1995) is frequently associated with the 
public communication ethos of the Royal Society (1985), and is increasingly an axiom of 
pejorative parlance within STS.  The deficit model sees the ‘administrative PUS researcher’ 
(Bauer, Allum and Miller, 2007) conducting research on behalf of scientific and political 
agencies, and information flows ‘one-way’, (downward) from these agencies to the public 
(Rowe and Frewer, 2005).  This unidirectionality is implicit in the unproblematic 
characterisations of the relationship between a monolithic ‘Public’ (P) – who do or do not 
Understand (U) a monolithic ‘Science’.  The Public are seen to approach scientific and 
technological issues from a position of ignorance (Irwin, 1995), and it is the responsibility of 
scientific and political institutions to ‘educate’ them through providing information on these 
issues.  The general assumption is that this ignorance leads to public ‘misunderstanding’ 
(Irwin and Wynne, 1996), which in turn leads to a lack of support for science and technology.  
Conversely, better science communication could lead to improved scientific literacy amongst 
the public, which in turn could lead to greater public support for science and technology.  The 
deficit maxim is seen to be ‘the more you know, the more you love it’ (Bauer, Allum and 
Miller, 2006).   
In relation to decision-making processes, because the Public are seen as de facto 
ignorant, they are therefore disqualified from partaking in S&T-related policy decisions 
(Bauer, Allum and Miller, 2006).  They are neither active nor involved in such decisions 
(Rowe and Frewer, 2005).  The role of Science and scientific advice in the deficit model is 
based on three further assumptions: it is objective, it lends authority to policy, and it separates 
the technical from the political (Irwin, Jones and Stilgoe, 2006).   This model is informed by 
an epistemologically positivist view of Science; a Mertonian normativist Science which 
(often successfully) appeals to standards such as disinterestedness and universalism (etc).  In 
this model, Science cannot be challenged by that which it defines as ‘non-science’ (including 
Public knowledge) (Gieryn, 1983).  In asserting the importance of esoteric knowledge to the 
formation of policy, Science becomes a ‘political resource’ (Nowotny, 1981) - the possession 
of which yields considerable political power (Nelkin, 1976, cf. Jasanoff, 2002).  Since the 
Royal Society (1985) report, there have been notable incidents in the UK related to S&T 
policymaking, which have – necessarily - prompted reflection on the triadic relationship 
between Science, the Public and political decision-making.  In particular, the inquiry into the 
BSE crisis of the 1990s (BSE Inquiry, 1998), which almost single-handedly shook the 
foundations upon which the aforementioned authority had been so carefully built, ushered in 
an era of governmental instability and reflexivity in regard to S&T policymaking.  This ‘civic 
dislocation’ (Jasanoff, 1997) proved to be fertile ground for the uptake of STS theory.  From 
this body of research has materialised what can be summarily referred to as the ‘constructivist 
model of PUS’.  The assumptions underlying this model will be more fully explicated in the 
following section.  However, it is necessary to have a basic understanding of how the 
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constructivist critique of the deficit model of PUS spawned the neo-deficit model of PUS in 
the guise of exogenic public participation.  Essentially, in the wake of the BSE Inquiry, 
government institutions (particularly – but not only – in the UK) sought for ways of re-
establishing public faith in Science and public trust in scientific advice-based policymaking.  
They drew on the hitherto overlooked arguments of STS.  Given the ill-fated consequences of 
the BSE crisis – which had revealed the perils of scientific hubris - it was acknowledged that 
Science could no longer unconditionally ‘speak to power’ (Collingridge and Reeve, 1986).  
Terms common within the STS idioms – terms such as ‘accountability’, ‘openness’ and 
‘transparency’ - quickly became political ‘buzzwords’.  Authority it was said would be built 
on ‘dialogue’ with the Public about Science, rather than deference of the Public to Science.  
The democratic theories upon which much STS critique was based were crystallized into a 
new definition - ‘engagement’; one which claimed that the Public were to actively 
‘participate’ in decision-making on S&T issues. 
 
 Endogenic 
Participation 
Mesogenic 
Participation 
Exogenic 
Participation 
Organised by Citizens Independent social 
scientist 
Sponsor(s) 
Funded by Citizens 
(citizens/voluntary 
groups) 
Independent source 
e.g. Research Council, 
academic funding 
body   
Sponsor(s) 
Type of 
Knowledge  
Polymorphic 
knowledge 
 
Constructivist 
Polymeric knowledge 
 
Pragmatist 
Dyadic knowledge 
 
Positivist 
Form of 
inquiry 
Dialogic inductivism Holistic dialogic 
inquiry 
Dialogic deductivism 
Degree of 
structuring 
Relatively unstructured ‘Guided’ by social 
science 
Relatively structured 
Direction of 
engagement 
Plural ‘publics’ (or 
active citizens) engage 
with experts 
Interactive citizens co-
operate with one 
another and with 
experts 
Experts engage with 
‘the Public’ (or 
passive citizens’) 
Evaluation 
criteria 
Evaluated according to  
context and democratic 
legitimacy of process 
Evaluated according 
to  outcomes 
(consequences) 
Evaluated according 
to instrumental 
effectiveness of 
decisions 
Possibility for  
policy action 
Low in comparison to 
the other models 
Lower than the 
exogenic model but 
higher than the 
endogenic model 
High in comparison 
to the other models 
 
Table 1: Summary features of the exogenic, endogenic and mesogenic models of models of 
public participation in S&T decision-making 
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Post-BSE Inquiry, exogenic public participation has been espoused by numerous political 
institutions.  They have replaced what we might see as an ‘exclusive repertoire’ of downward 
information communication (Royal Society, 1985) with what we might see as a more 
‘inclusive repertoire’ of two-way information exchange (see, House of Lords, 2000).  This 
aside, it can be suggested that many of these features reproduce many of the features of the 
deficit model of PUS, in participatory form.  A well known example of an exogenic 
participation process is the GM Nation? Public Debate, which was sponsored by the UK 
Government (Horlick-Jones et al, 2007).  Table 1 summarises the features of exogenic 
participation.  For example, most public participation processes, like public communication 
processes, are still sponsor-led.   The sponsors provide the funding and maintain a high level 
of control throughout the process, which is often rigidly structured from start to finish.  
Exogenic participation processes, like public communication PUS processes, are 
epistemologically positivist.  Although the processes do sometimes include what have been 
referred to as ‘alternative’ (Collins and Evans, 2007), ‘lay’ (e.g. Arksey, 1994), ‘indigenous’ 
(Leech, Scoones and Wynne, 2005) or ‘popular’ (Brown, 1987) ‘expertises’, they usually fail 
to consider them as forms of expertise in the same way that ‘Scientific knowledge’ is 
considered expertise.  As such, the former are accorded less status than the latter, and much 
of the evidence in exogenic participation processes is weighted in favour of the latter over the 
former. Knowledge in the exogenic model of participation is therefore dyadic in that it still 
presupposes a clear and relatively unproblematic demarcation between scientific and non-
scientific forms of knowledge (cf. Gieryn, 1983) or ‘expertise’.   
Sponsors or their ‘steering groups’ will usually have set in advance, a range of 
definite questions to which participants’ deliberations should be oriented.  In addition to this, 
there are often a set of (policy) options which are outlined by the sponsoring agency, from 
which the participants can choose (post-deliberation).  That is, exogenic participation entails 
finding ‘answers’ to predetermined, sponsor-set questions - something which has been 
referred to as the ‘use or choose’ approach to participation (Cornwall and Gaventa, 2001).  In 
this sense, the participants’ dialogic inquiry proceeds very much deductively.  This stems 
from its positivist epistemology, which is something it shares with the deficit (public 
communication) model of PUS.  The main difference however, between the deficit model of 
public communication and the neo-deficit model of public participation, is the directionality 
of information flow.  That is, in public participation information flows between sponsors and 
citizens (Rowe and Frewer, 2005).  As will be highlighted in the following section however, 
problems arise when discussion looks at how this information flow is organised, who it is 
organised by, and whether it is actually even, equal and democratic.  Members of ‘the Public’ 
produce ‘Public knowledge’ through the participation process, but the question is to 
paraphrase Weber and Marx , do they participate within ‘webs of significance’ which the 
citizens themselves have spun, or do inherit the terms of participation under circumstances 
not of their own choosing?  This question will be elaborated upon in the following section, 
but in short, organisation in the neo-deficit model of public participation, as in its deficit 
public communication antecedent, remains organised very much from the top-down, albeit in 
a more implicit and subtle manner.  Another feature of exogenic participation refers to the 
criterion by which it is evaluated.  As one would expect, given the high level of sponsor 
involvement, participation is evaluated according to the instrumental effectiveness of the 
decisions.  That is, the purpose of participation is to produce a ‘better’ process for decision-
making which leads to ‘better’, more politically ‘usable’ and more instrumentally rational 
decisions and policies.  The distinction between decisions which are good or bad again 
reflects the epistemic positivism characteristic of exogenic models of participation. Finally, 
there is a high possibility, in theory at least, that exogenic processes, will be followed up with 
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policy action(s), precisely because they are being organised by the agencies or institutions 
that possess the (respons)abilities for  such action(s).4  However, as will be discussed in the 
following section, the nature of exogenic participation raises questions as to whether these 
actions have genuinely and legitimately followed from the participation process itself. 
 
Endogenic Participation  
 
The endogenic model of public participation in S&T decision-making, as a critique of the 
neo-deficit model of public participation, has emerged from the constructivist critique of the 
deficit model of PUS.  As alluded to in the previous section, the fallibility of Science has 
been increasingly acknowledged in public and political domains, largely since the scientific 
controversies (e.g. BSE) of the 1990s.  This fallibility of course is something which STS had 
been discussing for (at least) the past two and a half decades, post-Kuhn (and Feyerabend etc) 
(see figure 2).  To borrow a Newtonian metaphor, it is on the shoulders of this giant corpus of 
scholarship which the constructivist critique of deficit PUS now stands.  This scholarship has 
argued how even ‘core’ scientific research is contingent on the socio-cultural context within 
which it is produced (e.g. Woolgar and Latour, 1978; Gilbert and Mulkay; Collins, 1985; 
Bijker, Hughes and Pinch, 1987; Latour, 1987; Woolgar, 1988; Knorr-Cetina, 1999). The 
constructivist critique of deficit PUS contends that laypersons, rather than being passive 
recipients of scientific knowledge (via public communication), contribute to its very 
production and definition – both through their active (re)interpretation of the scientific 
information received (Michael, 2002) and through bringing their own forms of expertise and 
experience to bear on the issues at stake (e.g. Wynne, 1985; Williams and Popay, 1994; 
Epstein, 1996).  As such, there is a re-definition of the term ‘understanding’ (u), wherein 
multiple, local interpretations of what constitutes science (s) are performed by plural 
‘publics’ (p) (e.g. Irwin, 1995). 
The constructivist critique of deficit PUS has also been used to inform a critical 
understanding of those forms of policy-relevant science which operate more explicitly in 
political domains.  The Kuhnian legacy of this model is apparent in its commonly-used 
moniker ‘post-normal science’ (Funtowitz and Ravetz, 1993; cf. Weinberg, 1972; see also, 
Jasanoff, 1994; Hilgartner, 2000).  The post-normal thesis argues that in domains where 
science and policy are closely interfaced, either decision-stakes and/or systems uncertainties 
are high.  In such instances, there is a need for an ‘extended peer-review’ - effectively greater 
(non-scientific) public participation in decision-making processes (Funtowitz and Ravetz, 
1993; de Marchi and Ravetz, 1999; Ravetz, 2004).  Despite the fact that, in part, STS theory 
has influenced the development of political institutions’ inclusive repertoire, STS scholars 
have not responded to the exogenic model of participation positively.  They take issue with 
the ‘new tyranny’ of participation (Cooke and Kothari, 2001) which paradoxically sees 
participation processes as simply reproducing existing forms of control or oppression, and as 
having a ‘disciplining and thus participation-closing role’ (Leach, Scoones and Wynne, 2005: 
11).  Citizens themselves are seen to have very little say on the terms of their participation, 
which are set according to the sponsoring institution’s narrow, pre-existing frames (Irwin, 
2001; Hagendijk and Irwin, 2006) and presumptive normative models of the Public (Leach, 
Scoones and Wynne, 2005: 11).  Because members of the Public have little or no say in the 
formulation of the problem, in choosing the forms of scientific or technological expertise to 
be consulted, or setting in the agenda guiding deliberation, participation is seen to be empty 
                                                 
4 However, as the GM Nation? example shows, this is not necessarily the case in practice (e.g. Lezuan and 
Soneryd, 2007).  
12 
 
and meaningless.  Such attempts at participation, such ‘technologies of hubris’ are felt to be 
tokenistic means of legitimating decisions which are often pre-determined and are still based 
on a the traditional positivist model of expertise (Jasanoff, 2003).  What could be referred to 
as epistemological recidivism, or what has been referred to as ‘a very top-down commitment 
to the bottom-up’ (Horst, 2003, as cited in Irwin, 2006: 303), sees the positivist and 
reductionist characterisation of ‘the Public’ re-appearing in ‘neo-deficit’ guise.  
In keeping with its constructivist epistemology, the endogenic model (see table 1) 
holds that participation should be organised without the direct influence of a sponsoring 
agency, and should be flexible.  Because all forms of knowledge, including scientific 
knowledge are seen to be contingent, transient and context-specific, participation processes 
must be sufficiently flexible so as to allow for this epistemic mutability.  Knowledge, rather 
than being static and dyadic - conceived of in terms of science/non-science - is instead 
conceived of as having multiple and changing forms, and could therefore be termed 
polymorphic (i.e. relativist) in nature.  To account for this, endogenic participation needs to 
be fairly unstructured vis-a-vis exogenic participation.  Those citizens involved are not only 
able to set the terms of participation from the start, but are more importantly able to adapt and 
amend them as participation proceeds.   In this model, the notion of a monolithic ‘Public’ is 
replaced by the notion of plural ‘publics’, and, in specifically in relation to participation in 
S&T decision-making, by the notion of the active ‘citizen’.  It is the active citizen who 
assumes or accepts a direct role in the organisation of that decision-making process within 
which s/he is participating.  This role allows the citizen to frame the terms of their own 
participation and to largely control both the practical procedural choices related to the 
specific process and the wider normative choices related to the purpose of participation per 
se.  In regard to the former, it is felt that citizens should be able to create their own answers to 
problems which they (and not the sponsors) themselves have determined – something which 
has been referred to as the ‘make and shape’ approach to participation (Cornwall and 
Gaventa, 2001).  Dialogic inquiry proceeds very much inductively.  Citizens are able to 
(re)construct their own agenda, and decide which specific experts are relevant to the issue.   
In regard to the latter, citizens phrase and confront normative questions such as: what are the 
problems and how should they be answered, as well as: what does it mean to be an expert and 
what does it mean to be a citizen?  Whereas the exogenic model is seen to enable men and 
women to participate, but under terms inherited and not of their own choosing, the endogenic 
model sees participation as taking place within ‘webs of significance’ which the citizens 
themselves have spun directly.  In this model, public knowledges engage with expert 
knowledges and organisation is therefore seen as ‘bottom-up’.  An example of the difference 
between the endogenic and exogenic models would be that whilst in the latter, participants 
would discuss whether and what (predetermined) action(s) should be taken to mitigate against 
any possible risks of, say a new technology, in the former, participants would be able to 
discuss whether this technology should be considered useful to society in the first place.  To 
table 1 might be added a further distinction between the endogenic and exogenic models, the 
latter being typically ‘downstream’, whilst the former being ideally ‘upstream’.  This implies 
then that not only should citizens assume a direct role early on in the organisation of a 
participation process, but that the participation process should itself take place early on in the 
development of that S&T issue (e.g. in the development and ‘rolling-out’ of a new 
technology).  Endogenic participation is largely evaluated according to the criterion of 
democratic legitimacy.  Itself a highly contested and interpretable term, democratic 
legitimacy as a criterion stands more for the quality of the means by which decisions are 
produced, than the quality of the decisions as ends per se.  Although precisely what 
constitutes ‘democratic legitimacy’ varies widely between constructivist scholars, those 
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features which generally speaking seen to be undemocratic and illegitimate, are those which 
are associated with the exogenic model of participation.    
Theoretically, the likelihood that endogenic processes would be followed by policy 
action is low in comparison to those (exogenic) processes which have been directly organised 
and funded by a sponsoring agency or institution with the relevant responsibilities.  In any 
case, examples of participation processes which are truly bottom-up are thin on the ground, 
so to speak.  The reasons for why this might be the case will be discussed in more detail in 
the following section, although it is important to note here that this is clearly a limitation of 
this model, which at present exists more comfortably in theory than in practice.  It should also 
be noted that of those few processes which do explicitly claim to be bottom-up, such as the 
‘do-it-yourself’ citizens’ jury (PEALS, 2004) – in spite of them allowing for citizens to 
determine their own terms of reference – are still initiated and facilitated by the social 
scientist, and cannot therefore be classed as ‘bottom-up’ in the fullest sense. 
The reasons as to why there is a lack of practical examples of endogenic participation will be 
discussed in more detail below. 
 
Mesogenic participation   
 
Does public participation need social science or does social science need public 
participation? 
 
The mesogenic model is defined primarily by the fact that those participation processes 
which constitute it are social science-led.  There are still relatively few practical examples of 
mesogenic participation processes, although a few are beginning to emerge.  The vast 
majority of participation processes are exogenic.  In STS for example, the role of the social 
scientist in public participation has largely been at the analytic level, and there is a substantial 
amount of empirical work evaluating existing government-led public participation processes 
(e.g. Irwin, 2001; 2006; Rowe et al, 2005. See also, Rowe and Frewer, 2004).  This, as we 
have seen, has led to theoretical support for the development of endogenic participation 
processes (of which there are also very few practical examples).  The exogenic and endogenic 
models do have in common the fact that the independent social scientist is primarily involved 
in an analytic capacity only – retrospectively in the case of the former, and prospectively in 
the case of the latter.  It is worth pointing out that social scientists are invariably involved in 
the organisation of exogenic processes – however, these generally work for, or within, the 
sponsoring agency, and significantly cannot therefore be classed as ‘independent’ social 
scientists (as discussed below).  Also, a citizen-led model, as defined by social scientists 
themselves, should have as little external (non-citizen) involvement as possible.  .  
 The presentation of public participation in terms of the top-down vs. bottom-up binary 
has led some social scientists to perceptively question (the relevance of) their own role in this 
area.  For example, Kotchetkova and Evans (2007: 5) ask ‘what is the role of the social 
scientist in a deliberative exercise?’  In an attempt to answer their own question, they offer 
two provisional suggestions.  They suggest that the social scientist could either [continue to] 
play the role of analyst or they could play the role of facilitator.  Whilst the latter role is less 
involved, and therefore ‘more in keeping with the spirit of deliberation’ the former ‘retains 
the idea of the social scientist as an expert in their own right’ (Kotchetkova and Evans, 2007: 
5).  This idea of the social scientist as expert stems from Evans’ work (with Collins) on the 
normative categorisation of different types of expertises (Collins and Evans, 2002, 2007), 
which will be returned to later in this paper. In constructivist STS research, which contributes 
to the endogenic model of participation, the analytic role has been given priority.  
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Conversely, those social scientists who are employed by sponsoring agencies to carry out 
exogenic participation processes are given a more facilitatory role.  It is of course likely that 
social scientists are employed by the sponsors for methodological design and implementation.  
However, because they do so within (and are constrained by) the wider frames and demands 
of the sponsoring agency, any claim to the process being ‘independently organised’ lacks 
credibility.  Where the terms of participation have been pre-framed by a sponsoring agency, 
any involvement thereafter is arguably more facilitatory than organisational.     
As is hopefully clear by now, the aim of this paper is to question the utility of the top-
down/bottom-up binary.  It is not possible to see the social scientist as capable of fulfilling 
both of the above roles and others as well?  Again, echoing Dewey (1963), rather than seeing 
their role ‘in terms of Either-Ors’, could we not see the social scientist as being responsible 
for facilitating and analysing a participation process which they themselves – and not the 
sponsors or the citizens - have designed and organised?  In order to do so, it is necessary to 
expand the top-down/bottom-up binary and allow for a third social science-led model which 
can offset some of the limitations in both these models.  The mesogenic model, discussed in 
more detail below, represents the claim that public participation processes can benefit from 
the independent social scientist playing a more direct and comprehensive role in their 
organisation.  However, this relationship can be seen to be a mutually beneficial one.  Evans 
(2008a) has argued that the popularity within STS of the ‘democratization of expertise’ 
should not blind us to the fact that doing so risks erasing the idea of expertise itself, including 
by implication the notion of the ‘social scientist as expert’.  Firstly, the characterisation of 
new forms alternative/lay/indigenous/popular expertises threatens the authority of traditional 
expertises, such as those associated with all forms of science (including the social as well as 
the natural sciences). Secondly, the very existence of public participation processes, in which 
the citizens themselves are analysing expert knowledge, threatens the very relevance of the 
social scientist within this field of research (Evans, 2008b).  As others have noted, the role of 
citizens within processes of deliberative democracy are in many respects akin to the type of 
inquiry practiced by social scientists (Bohman, 1999).  Taking this to its logical extreme, we 
might ask whether allegiance to the endogenic model is therefore a form of ‘sociological 
martyrdom’.  If the popularity of citizen-led participation processes were to grow and spread 
from the academic sphere to the public sphere itself, then it might lead those within the latter 
to ask whether the social scientist is actually needed in this area of research.  At present 
however, this is somewhat of a moot point, given that, as suggested above, very few 
examples of endogenic participation exist.  Nevertheless, this consideration does tie the 
mesogenic model to wider debates concerning the practical role(s) of STS within society.  
Coopmans, Neyland and Woolgar (2004) discuss public engagement as one of a number of 
criteria for future progress within STS.  They caution that ‘if STS is not engaged in contexts 
of application beyond its traditional scholarly concerns ... will it be in a good position to 
continue?’  If ‘public participation’ as an area of research is to progress, then arguably the 
idea of the social-scientist-as-organiser is useful, not only to those taking part in, and affected 
by, the processes, but also to the continued relevance of the social scientist in this area of 
research.  Before this claim can be given any credit however, it is necessary first to provide a 
fuller description of what the mesogenic model of participation (including the role of the 
social scientist within it) actually entails. 
 
The role of the independent social scientist 
 
Mesogenic participation, as the name suggests, is any form of public participation which is 
generated from the middle-out.  That it, is it organised neither by the sponsoring agency, nor 
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directly by the citizens taking part in the participation process.  As suggested above, the need 
for some form of mesogenic participation stems from the limitations of both the top-down 
and the bottom-up approaches - particularly the theoretical (legitimation) deficiencies of the 
former, and the practical (application) deficiencies of the latter.  To suggest however, that 
participation is more advantageously organised by a third party, is not necessarily to suggest 
that the independent social scientist is the only possible third party organiser.  The case must 
be made therefore, as to why the social scientist is best placed for this role.  This case centres 
around two main criteria: organisational objectivity and organisational capability. 
 Firstly, there is a need for any public participation process to be organised as 
objectively as possible.  Whilst it is acknowledged that the term ‘objective’ is, in the social 
sciences at least, a contentious one, and whilst in the eyes of many, ‘pure’ objectivity is 
somewhat of a chimera, it is still possible to use objectivity as an organisational criterion. 
That is, one can think in terms of degrees of objectivity.  To this end, it might be more useful 
to use the term ‘detachment’ as a synonym for objectivity.  Because outputs and processes 
are, to an extent, necessarily inextricable – that is, the decisions made through participation 
must be in part a product of the actual process itself – careful attention must be paid to how 
the process is constructed.  In particular, attention needs to be paid to the information being 
fed into participation exercises, so that citizens’ deliberations are an analysis, and not simply 
a reflection, of that information.  In many ways, the choice of what information is fed into the 
participation process (and from what sources this information is taken) is (one of) the most 
important organisational choice(s).  Such a choice is necessary because citizens naturally 
cannot digest everything there is to know about a given S&T issue.  Furthermore, such a 
choice is important, because if information was unnecessarily skewed in favour of one 
particular (expert/stakeholder) point of view or another, then it would follow that the citizens’ 
deliberations would also be unnecessarily skewed in favour of that (expert/stakeholder) point 
of view.  As such, the content and direction of the citizens’ deliberations would not so much 
be an analysis of the debate or problem as a whole, but would rather be a one-sided 
reproduction of a subjective (expert/stakeholder) interpretation of that debate or problem.  
This is a simplification of the constructivist argument (above), which criticises the tendency 
of the sponsor in exogenic participation to impose narrow framings on the process’ agenda 
for example.  It follows that the task of organisation needs to be entrusted to someone whose 
subjectivities are not directly and heavily invested in the substantive issue itself; to someone 
who has an indirect intellectual interest in the substantive S&T issue, but whose direct 
material interests are not invested in that issue.  It is argued that the independent social 
scientist satisfies these requirements.  S/he is both intellectually interested in the substantive 
S&T area (otherwise they would not be studying public participation in that area) and 
presumably does not have any invested material (conflict of) interests in that area.  Whilst 
social scientists are, to varying degrees, engaged professionally with their substantive areas, 
generally speaking they are more detached than those who are the subject of their study.5  In 
public participation research, the ability of the independent social scientist to be materially 
and personally detached than would-be sponsors (who are directly involved in the substantive 
issue) allows them to feed in information which is more representative of the debate as a 
whole, and which is more inclusive of all the different expert/stakeholder points of view.  
Subsequently, deliberations can be thought of as a sort of meta-analysis of different 
expert/stakeholder accounts of the issue, rather than a straightforward analysis of that 
                                                 
5 Some methods are an exception to this.  In participant observation for example, the aim of the social scientist 
is to become an ‘insider’.   
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expert/stakeholder account which is most closely aligned to the interests of the sponsoring 
body.   
Secondly, there is a need to acknowledge that not everyone is capable of organising a 
public participation process, which is conceptually, methodologically and practically quite 
complex.  Whilst official sponsoring bodies and their employed researchers lack the 
necessary detachment, they do however possess the capability, in terms of skills and resource.  
Whilst citizens themselves possess the necessary detachment, questions must be asked as to 
whether they have at their disposal the necessary capabilities, in terms of skills and resources.  
Davies et al (2007) have argued that despite the theoretical merits of citizen-led participation 
processes, as identified in the STS literature (e.g. (Webler 1995; Pickard 1998; Hagendijk and 
Irwin, 2006), in practice this might not be so feasible.  As suggested above, there is little 
empirical (in contrast to theoretical) work exploring how this could be achieved practically 
(Mort, Harrison and Dowswell 1999: 103), and examples of ‘citizen-led’ participation 
processes (e.g. PEALS, 2004), still tend to be, to an extent, engendered and facilitated by the 
social scientist (thus arguably making them more mesogenic than endogenic).  One does not 
have to think hard as to why examples of endogenic participation are thin on the ground.  
Generally speaking, participation processes are expensive, both in terms of money and time.  
Citizens Juries for example, can cost upwards of ten thousand dollars (or its equivalent) per 
exercise (e.g. Jefferson Center, 2004).  Also, the organisation of a participation process can 
demand the attention of a team of full time employees.  It is unrealistic to expect citizens to 
be able and willing to afford the monetary costs of organisation.  So too is it unrealistic to 
expect many ‘full-time citizens’ to exist, due to the existence of people’ myriad commitments 
related to, for example, family and employment (etc).  Of course, a citizen’s other 
commitments do contribute toward their total stock of ‘civic knowledge’ as well as to their 
sense of civic duty.  The downside is that these commitments also serve to limit the amount 
of time that he or she could potentially dedicate to the organisation of a participation process.  
A more fundamental problem lies in getting people interested in participating in the first 
instance.  As the example of the GM Nation? public debate shows, where processes allow 
participants to self-select, they leave themselves at risk of becoming interest-driven (Pidgeon 
et al, 2005).6  It seems as though those forms of public involvement which are truly 
endogenic and citizen-led, are likely associated with the kind of (new) social movements 
discussed previously.  As was argued above, these are not considered forms of ‘public 
participation’ as such, precisely because the participants already possess strong views about 
the issue at stake.  In public participation processes, the arguments and experiences of social 
movement actors are considered relevant, but they are more appropriately fed into the 
deliberative process as a form of (alternative/lay/indigenous/popular) expertise.   
The most practical solution to the problems of objectivity and capability which have 
blighted the exogenic and endogenic models is to specifically employ someone who has the 
necessary skills to carry out the participation process.  Importantly, because of the criticisms 
associated with sponsor-employed organisers, as discussed above, there is good cause for this 
employee to be independently-employed.  It is not sufficient to state however that the 
independent social scientist is best suited to the organisation of a participation exercise 
simply because he or she is already in a line of employment which allows it.  We might just 
as easily conceive of a participation process organised by an ‘independent consultant’, such 
as a public relations (PR) professional, who could be employed specifically for this purpose.  
Although a process organised by such a third party could justifiably claim to be more 
                                                 
6 In the GM Nation? initial public consultation meetings were heavily (over‐) attended by anti‐GM protestors 
(see, Pidgeon et al, 2005). 
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objective than the sponsor-led process, there is still a case to be made in favour of the 
independent social scientist, since they already possess the skills required for the organisation 
of a public participation process.  Whilst they are not directly involved in the production of 
scientific knowledge, they are sufficiently informed about the issue so as to understand the 
production and the implications of the scientific knowledge (Collins and Evans (2002) would 
distinguish this as ‘interactional’ rather than ‘contributory’ expertise).  The ‘detached 
comprehension’ (or interactional expertise) of the social scientist enables them to make 
informed decisions as to which (contributory) experts and stakeholders are important to the 
debate and what themes and sub-issues are important to the debate.  Furthermore, as 
suggested above, the mesogenic model, as well as encouraging the social scientist to organise 
and facilitate the participation process, can also allow them to retain their role as analyst.  To 
this end they are well suited as experts in civic and social interaction (cf. Jasanoff, 2003) of 
which public participation is a form (Webler, 1995). 
 
The features of mesogenic participation   
 
In addition to the role of the independent social scientist as organiser, it is possible to identify 
a number of additional features which constitute a suggested characterisation of the 
mesogenic model of public participation (see table 1).  There are a growing number of public 
participation processes which have been organised from within the social sciences.  Examples 
of mesogenic participation processes could include the ‘Deliberative Opinion Poll’ (Fishkin 
et al, 2000), the ‘Deliberative Mapping (DM)’ approach (Burgess et al, 2007), and the work 
of Policy, Ethics and Life Sciences Research Centre (PEALS) at Newcastle University.  Each 
is based on specific assumptions of what a ‘good’ participation process should entail.  
However, there is less general reflection on the role of the social scientist, and of the relation 
of the specific process to a wider programme of social science-led participation research.  
The creators of DM do account for the philosophical origins of their method, which is seen to 
derive from the work of Webler (1995) via Stern and Fineberg’s (1996) characterisation of 
risk assessment as an ‘analytic-deliberative process’.  This process in turn is a conscious 
attempt to reconcile ‘technocratic’ and ‘citizen-centric’ approaches (Stern and Fineberg, 
1996, in Burgess et al, 2007).  Their approach, despite being admirably symmetrical and 
integrative sees deliberative elements (i.e. participants’ views) being subjected to a degree of 
quantification (via the use of multi-criteria mapping) – something which is at odds with most 
purist conceptions of deliberative democracy (which can also be said of the deliberative 
opinion poll approach).  The point of relevance here however, is that the social scientist aims 
to construct an integrative process in which technocratic (i.e. top-down) and citizen-centric 
(i.e. bottom-up) elements run alongside one another.  The organisers of the Nanojury 
(PEALS) similarly see their project as being representative of a ‘two-way street’ model of 
participation.  However, their interpretation of ‘mutualistic’ engagement leads to a bipartite 
division of the participatory process, where the citizens set one agenda, and the stakeholders 
and organisers set another.  This can result, as was the case in the Nanojury, in the existence 
of two very separate agendas, and a discussion which not unlike the exogenic model above 
entails a dyadic separation of ‘scientific’ from ‘political’ issues.7   Before discussing in more 
detail the specific features of a mesogenic model of participation, it is important to emphasise 
                                                 
7 The Nanojury entailed ‘bottom‐up’ and ‘top‐down’ processes running consecutively.  Citizen jurors were 
allowed to chose the first issue (young people and exclusion) whilst stakeholders and organisers chose the 
second (nanotechnology).  In the former, organisers acted as ‘critical friends’, whilst in the latter they assumed 
a more dominant role meaning the citizens took ‘little more than a passive role’ (Singh, no date). 
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that this is one possible and suggested characterisation of social science-led participation.  
The ‘two-way street’ and ‘analytic-deliberative’ models also represent social-science led 
participation processes.  In addition to the essentiality of the social scientist-as-organiser, they 
do not necessarily display all the features of mesogenic participation, as outlined in table 1. 
The salient point is that this characterisation, as part of the wider typology, can serve as a 
heuristic device for future empirical research (in the form of participation processes) 
conducted from within the social sciences.  In turn, this future empirical research can feed 
back into this heuristic characterisation and modify it where appropriate.  
Mesogenic participation it is argued can be defined according to a set of unique and 
particular characteristics. It can, for example, can be considered semi-structured, insofar as 
processes are guided rather than controlled by the social scientist.  The mesogenic process is 
less rigidly structured than the exogenic participation process, but not as unstructured as the 
endogenic model.  The social scientist is charged with the impartial definition of the (policy) 
problem(s) and in setting the agenda, selecting relevant experts and stakeholder points of 
view, collecting the initial evidence and initiating the citizens’ deliberations.  It should not be 
overlooked however that some have warned that the direct involvement of social science in 
participation processes is not without problems of its own.  Rayner (2003) for example, 
questions whether this is merely the substitution of one form of technocracy for another.  The 
question is a fair one – does the mesogenic model simply replace traditional scientism 
(associated with the deficit and neo-deficit models above) with social scientism?  In some 
respects, the mesogenic model can be seen to fall short of the democratic ideal set by the 
endogenic model, because the processes are not entirely ‘ruled by the people’.  However, if 
we are to see the preservation of deliberative liberty as a central criterion for legitimacy, and 
if we are to agree with Dewey (1963) that ‘guidance can be an aid to freedom, not a 
restriction upon it’, then the mesogenic model can be seen to be more democratic than 
technocratic.  Of course, the important point remains that structuring in the mesogenic model 
is not only more detached than structuring associated with exogenic participation processes, 
but also it allows for greater flexibility.  As suggested above, organising a participation 
process not only requires skills and experience in social and civic interaction, but also a 
satisfactory comprehension of the substantive S&T issue.   
The endogenic model as we have seen allows citizens to actively (re)define 
participation in their own terms.  In the mesogenic model however, ‘citizens’ are not defined 
as such (a priori) before participation.  Rather, what it means to be a ‘citizen’ is defined by 
the participants themselves during the participation process.  In this respect, participation 
processes construct citizens as much as citizens construct participation processes.  The notion 
of an ‘interactive citizen’ who cooperate with one another, with ‘experts’ and with the social 
scientist in order to define not only the nature of the substantive S&T problem(s) – including 
the usefulness of a new technology’s societal applications for example -  but also the nature 
of underlying assumptions concerning participation and citizenship in general.  The 
mesogenic model differs to the exogenic and endogenic models because it assumes neither 
that citizens are incapable of organising participation processes at all nor are they fully 
capable of organising them ‘from scratch’.  Rather, it assumes that as citizens become 
increasingly informed – through the act of participation – they are increasingly qualified to 
adapt and amend the terms of their participation as they see fit.  This allows for the 
redefinition of the (policy) problem(s), the restructuring of the agenda, and the selection of 
new and different ‘experts’ and ‘evidence’ – terms which are themselves subject to 
redefinition during the course of deliberation.  Although participation commences according 
to terms not of the citizens’ own making, these terms can be readily redefined by the citizens 
themselves (who ‘re-spin the webs of significance’ we might say).   Participatory inquiry in 
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the mesogenic model is holistic, insofar as it not only contains elements of deductive and 
inductive reasoning, but also retroductive (or abductive) reasoning.8  The emphasis here is on 
providing explanations (in the form of arguments and suggested courses of action etc.) which 
are always provisional and tentative, but which are seen to be the best explanations for that 
(S&T problem) under discussion.  Knowledge in the mesogenic model is neither dyadic nor 
polymorphic, but might be thought of more accurately as polymeric – insofar as it is produced 
as a result of the continued ‘linking together’ of ‘separate parts’.  These ‘separate parts’ are 
pieces of sensory, empirical information – experience – which are ‘linking together’, and 
made sense of through the process of inquiry per se (in this case through mesogenic 
participatory inquiry).9  For the pragmatist, the only type of knowledge which can be 
considered valid – or useful rather – is that which is rooted in experience. It is through 
experiencing the consequences of past chosen courses of action, that we can (incrementally) 
acquire knowledge which can be used to inform future decisions concerning related courses 
of action.  It is this piecemeal, this ‘trial and error’ approach to epistemic inquiry, which 
allows us to suggest that pragmatism is well-suited to the problem-solving demands of S&T 
decision-making.  As such, mesogenic participation is evaluated retrospectively 
(retroductively) according to consequences of the chosen course of action.  Participation in 
the mesogenic model should not, as is often the case in the exogenic model, consist of one off 
tokenistic exercises, but rather should consist of repeated processes as part of a long-term 
commitment to the development of democratic and effective decisions on a given S&T issue.  
As discussed above, the exogenic model has low procedural (democratic) legitimacy but high 
procedural effectiveness (i.e. a high chance of policy action), whilst the endogenic model has 
high procedural (democratic) legitimacy but low procedural effectiveness (i.e. a low chance 
of policy action).  The mesogenic model finds a compromise between these two criteria.  
Whilst its processes might neither be fully democratically legitimate (compared to endogenic 
processes) nor fully effective (compared to exogenic processes), as a pragmatic model for 
citizen participation, it aims towards a “trade-off” – a realistic compromise - between 
legitimacy and effectiveness.  As discussed above, the role of the social scientist is key to the 
facilitation of this compromise.  It is only through the actual ‘experiencing’ of participation 
process that allows us to decide not only whether criteria such as procedural ‘effectiveness’ 
and ‘legitimacy’ can be applied, but also whether such criteria should themselves be 
considered applicable in the first place.  
 
Conclusion: Where do we start next? 
 
This paper has constructed a typology of public participation models. It has (re-) 
characterised the top-down and bottom-up approaches to public participation as the exogenic 
and endogenic models.  The chronological development and conceptual antecedents of these 
models were discussed, before a set of characteristic features was suggested.  Critical 
                                                 
8 The pragmatist model of holistic inquiry was outlined by Pragmatism’s ‘founding father’ C.S. Peirce (see for 
example, Peirce, 1878).  Although complex in its intricacies, the significance of retroduction or abduction as 
applied here simply asks us to tie together what we physically know (i.e. sensory phenomena) with 
hypothetical know (i.e. what we think might best account for those phenomena).  It therefore is a links 
together inductive and deductive inquiry.  
9 The term ‘polymeric’ is introduced as a (hopefully useful) metaphor for knowledge as conceived by the 
pragmatists.  It is less concerned with the epistemological demarcation of objectivism from subjectivism, and is 
more concerned with how knowledge is accumulated (not necessarily linearly) through the gradual 
accumulation of experience – which is itself a synthetic product of the interaction between an sensory world 
and the interpretive (hypothesizing) work of social actors. 
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discussion of these features was used to suggest the usefulness of a third model, one which is 
beginning to take root within social science research - the mesogenic model.  The mesogenic 
model is defined primarily by the fact that those participation processes which constitute it 
are social science-led.  That is, most if not all of the elements of the process are organised by 
the independent social scientist.  It is they who are responsible (provisionally at least) for 
setting the agenda, choosing a balanced selection of various ‘experts’, and constructing the 
forum within which citizens can deliberate.  The need for an independent organiser was 
emphasised and the criteria of organisational objectivity (or detachment) and organisational 
capability were used to argue that the social scientist is well suited to this task.  It was also 
provocatively suggested that, for ‘public participation’ research to progress, then the idea of 
the social-scientist-as-organiser is useful, not only to those taking part in and affected by 
public participation processes, but also to the social scientist and their continued relevance in 
this field of research.  
The typology outlined above is in the true sense of the term a ‘work-in-progress’.  It is 
fitting therefore that it be published first in working paper format.  It is hoped that the 
typology can act as a heuristic tool for future practical research within the field of public 
participation, both in terms of scientific and technological decision-making and also in terms 
of decision-making more generally.  In part, the typology also suggests that the mesogenic 
model holds much promise for future public participation processes which, to a degree, 
manage to avoid the main problems encountered by the exogenic and endogenic models.  
Such a model could however, not justifiably claim to be pragmatic, if it simultaneously 
claimed to be the finished article.  It is hoped then that this working paper will receive 
comment and constructive criticism, based on the work of others, which will contribute to its 
ongoing (re-)formulation. 
 
 
 
References 
Abelson, J. Forest, P., Eyles, J., Smith, P., Martin, E. and Gauvan, P. (2003) ‘Deliberations 
About Deliberative Methods: Issues in the Design and Evaluation of Public Participation 
Processes’, Social Science and Medicine 57(2): 239-51. 
Arksey, H. (1998) RSI and the Experts : the Construction of Medical Knowledg, London: 
UCL Press. 
Bauer, M. Allum, N. and Miller, S. (2007) ‘What Have We Learnt From 25 Years of PUS 
Survey Research: Liberating and Expanding the Agenda’, Public Understanding of Science 
16(1): 79-95. 
Bijker, W. Hughes, T. and Pinch, T. (1987) The Social Construction of Technological 
Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology, Cambridge, MA.: MIT 
Press. 
Bohman, J. (1999) ‘Democracy as Inquiry, Inquiry as Democratic: Pragmatism, Social 
Science, and the Cognitive Division of Labor,’ American Journal of Political Science 43(2): 
590-60.    
Brown, P. (1987) ‘Popular Epidemiology: Community Response to Toxic Waste-induced 
Disease in Woburn, Massachusetts’, Science, Technology and Human Values 12(3/4): 78-85. 
BSE Inquiry (1998) London Stationary Office (available also at 
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk) 
Burgess, J. et al (2007) ‘Deliberative Mapping: a Novel Analytic-Deliberative Methodology 
to Support Contested Science-Policy Decisions,’ Public Understanding of Science 16(3): 
299-322. 
21 
 
Cohen, J. (1997) ‘Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy,’ in Bohman, J. and Rehg, W. 
(eds.), Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, London: MIT Press. 
Collingridge, D. and Reeve, C. (1986) Science Speaks to Power: The Role of Experts in 
Policymaking, New York: St Martin’s Press. 
Collins, H., (1985) Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice. 
London: University of Chicago Press. 
Collins, H. and Evans, R., (2002) ‘The Third Wave of Science Studies: Studies of Expertise 
and Experience’, Social Studies of Science 32(2): 235–296. 
Collins and Evans (2007) Rethinking Expertise, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Cooke, B. and Kothari, U. (2001) Participation: The New Tyranny, London: Zed Books. 
Coopmans, C. Neyland, D. and Woolgar, S. (2008) Does STS Mean Business? Some Issues 
and Questions, Position Paper, Report on the International Workshop, 30th June, Said 
Business School, Oxford University, Oxford. 
Cornwall, A. and Gaventa, J. (2001) ‘From Users and Choosers to Makers and Shapers: 
Repositioning Participation in Social Policy’, IDS Bulletin 31(4): 50-62. 
Della Porta, D. and Diani, M. (1998) Social Movements: An Introduction (1st edition), 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
Della Porta, D. and Diani, M. (2006) Social Movements: An Introduction (2nd edition), 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
Dewey (1963) Experience and Education, New York: Collier Books. 
Elster, J. (1997) ‘The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory’, in J. 
Bohman and W. Rehg (eds.), Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, 
London: MIT Press. 
Elster, J. (ed.) (1998) Deliberative Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Epstein, S. (1996) Impure Science: AIDS Activism and the Politics of Knowledge, Berkeley, 
CA.: University of California Press. 
Evans, R. (2008a) ‘The Sociology of Expertise: The Distribution of Social Fluency’, 
Sociology Compass 2(1): 281-98 (available online at: http://www.blackwell-
compass.com/home_sociology_compass ). 
Evans, R. (2008b ) comment made during the Giving Voice to Citizens?: Deliberative Inquiry 
and Qualitative Research in the Policy Making Process conference, 11th April, Royal 
Society: London. 
Fiorino, D. (1990) ‘Citizen Participation and Environmental Risk: A Survey of Institutional 
Mechanisms’, Science, Technology and Human Values 15(2): 226-43.. 
Fishkin, J., Luskin, R. and Jowell, R.(2000) ‘Deliberative Polling and Public Consultation’, 
Parliamentary Affairs 53(4): 657-666. 
Funtowicz, S. and Ravetz, J., (1993) ‘Science in the post-normal age’, Futures, 25(7): 739–
755. 
Gieryn, T. (1983) ‘Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science from Non-Science: 
Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists,’ American Sociological Review 
Gutmann, A. and Thompson, D. (2004) Why Deliberative Democracy? Princeton, NJ.: 
Princeton University Press. 
Habermas, J. (1996) Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law 
and Democracy, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT. 
Hagendijk R. and Irwin, A. (2006) ‘Public Deliberation and Governance: Engaging with 
Science and Technology in Contemporary Europe’, Minerva 44(2): 167-84. 
Hilgartner, S. (2000) Science on Stage: Expert Advice as Public Drama. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press. 
22 
 
Horlick-Jones, T., Rowe, G. and Walls, J. (2007) ‘Citizen Engagement Processes as 
Information Systems: the Role of Knowledge and the Concept of Translation Quality’, Public 
Understanding of Science 16(3): 259-278. 
House of Lords (2000) Science and Technology: Third Report, London: Stationary Office. 
Irwin, A. (1995), Citizen Science, London, Routledge. 
Irwin, A. (2001) ‘Constructing the Scientific Citizen: Science and Democracy in the 
Biosciences,’ Public Understanding of Science 10(1): 1-18. 
Irwin, A. (2006) ‘The Politics of Talk: Coming to Terms with the ‘New’ Scientific 
Governance,’ Social Studies of Science 36(2): 299-320 
Irwin, A. and Wynne, B. (1996) Misunderstanding Science?: The Public Reconstruction of 
Science and Technology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Irwin, A., Jones, K. And Stilgoe, J. (2006) The Received Wisdom: Opening Up Expert 
Advice, DEMOS Pamphlet. 
Jasanoff, S. (1990) The Fifth Branch: Scientific Advisers as Policymakers, Cambridge, MA.: 
Harvard University Press. 
Jasanoff, S. (2002) ‘Citizens at Risk: Cultures of Modernity in the US and EU’, Science as 
Culture 11(3): 363-80. 
Jasanoff, S. (2003) ‘Technologies of Humility: Citizen Participation in Governing Science,’ 
Minerva 41(3): 223-44. 
Jefferson Center (2004) Citizens’ Jury Handbook, available at: http://www.jefferson-
center.org/ (accessed online February 2009). 
Knorr-Cetina, K. (1999) Epistemic Cultures: How the Sciences Make Knowledge, 
Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press. 
Kotchetkova, I. and Evans, R. (2007) ‘Promoting Deliberation Through Research: Qualitative 
Methods and Public Engagement with Science and Technology,’ Qualiti Working Paper 007 
(November 2007), Cardiff University. 
Latour, B. (1987) Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through 
Society, Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press. 
Leach, M., Scoones, I. And Wynne, B. (2005) Science and Citizens: Globalisation and the 
Challenge of Engagement, London: Zed Press. 
Lezuan, J. and Soneryd, L. (2007) ‘Consulting Citizens: Technologies of Elicitation and the 
Mobility of Publics,’ Public Understanding of Science 16(3): 279-97. 
de Marchi, B. and Ravetz, J. (1999) ‘Risk Management and Governance: A Post-normal 
Science Approach’, Futures 31(7): 743-57. 
Mansbridge, J. (1980) Beyond Adversary Democracy. Chicago, Ill.: Chicago University 
Press. 
Michael, M. (2002) ‘Comprehension, Apprehension, Prehension: Heterogeneity and the 
Public Understanding of Science, Science, Technology and Human Values 27(3): 357-78. 
Mill, J. (1892) On Liberty.  London: Longman’s Green. 
Mort, M. Harrison, S. and Dowswell, T. (1999) ‘Public Health Panels: Influence at the 
Margins?’ in Khan, U. (ed.), Participation Beyond the Ballot Box: European Case Studies in 
State-Citizen Political Dialogue, London: UCL Press. 
Nelkin, D. (1975) ‘The Political Impact of Technical Expertise’, Social Studies of Science 
5(1): 35-54. 
Nowotny, H. (1981) ‘Experts and Expertise: On the Changing Relationsip Between Experts 
and Their Public’, Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society 1(3): 235-41. 
PEALS (2004) The DIY Citizens Jury Project, University of Newcastle, available at 
http://www.citizensjury.org (accessed online February 2009). 
23 
 
Peirce, C. (1878) ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’, Popular Science Monthly 12, reprinted in 
Malachowski, A. (ed.) (2004), Pragmatism, Volume 1: The Historical Development of 
Pragmatism, London: Sage. 
Pidgeon, N. Poortinga, W., Rowe, G. and Horlick-Jones, T. (2005) ‘Using Surveys in Public 
Participation Processes for Risk Decision Making: The Case of the 2003 British GM Nation? 
Public Debate’, Risk Analysis 25(2): 467-79.  
Porter, T. (1995) Trust in Numbers, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Ravetz, J. (2005) ‘The Post-normal Science of Precaution’, Water science and technology 
52(6): 11-17.  
Rayner, S. (2003) ‘Democracy in the Age of Assessment: Reflections on the Roles of 
Expertise and Democracy in Public-sector Decision-making,’ Science and Public Policy 
30(3): 163-70. 
Rowe, G. and Frewer, L.J. (2004) ‘Evaluating Public Participation Exercises: a Research 
Agenda’, Science, Technology, & Human Values 29(4): 512–56. 
Rowe, G. and Frewer, L.J. (2005) ‘A Typology of Public Engagement Mechanisms’, Science, 
Technology, & Human Values 30(2): 251–90. 
Rowe, G., Horlick-Jones, T., Walls, J. and Pidgeon, N. (2005) ‘Difficulties in Evaluating 
Public Engagement Initiatives: Reflections on an Evaluation of the UK GM Nation? Public 
Debate About Transgenic Crops’, Public Understanding of Science 14(4): 331-52. 
Royal Society, The (1985) The Public Understanding of Science, London: The Royal 
Society.  Reprinted as a Summary in Science, Technology and Human Values (1986) 11(3): 
53-60. 
Rucht, D. (1996) ‘The Impact of National Contexts on Social Movement Structures:  A 
Cross-Movement and Cross-National Comparison’, in McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. and Mayer 
Z. (eds.) Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. Political Opportunities, Mobilizing 
Structures and Cultural Framings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 185-204 
Stern, P. and Fineberg, H. (1996) Understanding Risk: Informing Decisions in a Democratic 
Society, Washington: National Academy Press. 
de Tocqueville, A. (1935) Democracy in America. London: Saunders and Otley. 
Wakeford, Y. (2002), Citizens’ Juries: A Radical Alternative for Social Research’, Social 
Research Update, Issue 37 (September 2002). URL (consulted May 2008): 
http://www.soc.surrey.ac.uk/sru/SRU37.html 
Webler, T. (1995) ‘"Right" Discourse in Citizen Participation: An Evaluative Yardstick,’ in 
Renn, O., Webler, T., and Wiedemann, P. (eds.), Fairness and Competence in Citizen 
Participation: Evaluating Models for Environmental Discourse, Boston: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers. 
Weinberg, A. (1972) ‘Science and Trans-Science’, Minerva 10(2): 209-222. 
Williams, G. and Popay, J. (1994) ‘Lay Knowledge and the Privilege of Experience’, in 
Gabe, J., Kelleher, D. And Williams, G. (eds.) Challenging Medicine, London: Routledge. 
Woolgar, S. (1988) Science: The Very Idea, London: Tavistock. 
Woolgar, S. and Latour, B. (1979) Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts, 
Beverly Hills, CA.: Sage. 
Wynne, B. (1985) ‘May the Sheep Safely Graze: A Reflexive View of the Expert-Lay 
Knowledge Divide’, in S. Lash and B. Szerszynski (eds.) Risk, Environment and Modernity, 
London: Sage. 
Wynne, B. (1995) ‘Public Understanding of Science,’ in Jasanoff, S., Markle, G. And 
Petersen, J. and Pinch, T. (eds.) Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, Thousand 
Oaks, Ca.: Sagea Publications. 
Young, I. (2000) Inclusion and Democracy.  Oxford: Oxford University Press 
